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Obrenovie: We've managed to catch a few more, either with guns or mines.
Krstie: Kill them all. God damn it.
Obrenovie: Everything, everything is going according to plan. Yes.
Krsti: [Not a] single one must be left alive.
Obrenovie: Everything is going according to plan. Everything.
Krstie: Way to go, Chief The Turks are probably listening to us. Let them listen, the
motherfuckers.
Obrenovi&: Yeah, let them.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to Serbia's surrender of Slobodon Milogevid to the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), General Radislav Krstid
was the biggest "big fish" to be put on trial in the Hague. Krstid seemed to cut
a sympathetic figure compared to many of the thugs and petty camp tyrants
who had previously appeared before the Tribunal's judges. A mild-mannered
professional soldier, Krsti6 had lost a leg in a land mine incident in December
1994 and was considered a valuable and cooperative partner with the Western
powers in implementing the Dayton Accords. 2 Krstid, however, also had a
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1. Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. rT-98-33, Transcript of Hearing, 6806-07 (Nov. 1, 2000).
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darker side. He had served as Chief of Staff and then Commander of the Drina
Corps, a formation of the Bosnian Serb Army, during July 1995 when the
Drina Corps participated in the forced evacuation of 25,000 Muslims from the
United Nations "safe haven" of Srebrenica. The Drina Corps was heavily
implicated in the accompanying massacre of approximately 7,000 Muslim
men of military age.3 Charged with genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity, Krstid did not deny that the executions and secret burials had taken
place. Instead, he insisted that he did not become commander of the Corps
until after the crucial week when the massacre happened, that during the time
in question he was miles away conducting an operation in 2epa, and lastly that
he did not even learn of the atrocities until months later, in August. 4
Ultimately, Krsti6's story came unraveled in the face of evidence from
hundreds of intercepts like the one that opens this Essay, recorded and
transcribed by the Bosnian Army. These intercepts "sealed KrstiS's fate," in
the words of ICTY Judge Patricia Wald.5 The Turks were, indeed, listening.
Modem international criminal tribunals cannot expect to have the benefit
of a lengthy paper trail to help them establish chains of command and
responsibility for war crimes. When Nuremberg prosecutor Robert Jackson
was assembling his case against top Nazi leaders, he had access to the full
treasure trove of documents from a vanquished enemy that was known for its
meticulous bureaucratic record-keeping. Many Nazi leaders never expected to
lose the war, or, at the very least, never anticipated being held accountable to
international justice. Contemporary tyrants may suffer similar delusions of
grandeur, but many have learned the lessons of their Nazi predecessors and
are less likely to give direct orders to kill or abuse.6 Indeed, the two greatest
mass murderers of the twentieth century, Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong,
seem to have left little in the way of a direct record.7 Further, modem criminal
tribunals like the ICTY often operate without the full cooperation of a state,
which may be hesitant to hand over documents that implicate current as well
as former leaders. Finally, even when a written record is available, the chain
of command on paper may differ significantly from the real one. A lead
investigator on the Milogevi6 team suggested that one of the key commanders
transmitting orders from Milogevi6 to the Serbian police forces, deputy prime
minister Nikola Sainovi6, did not even have a title in the police but was
"willing to do the dirty work.', 8 The result is that prosecutors in modem
criminal trials who seek to link the "big fish" to atrocities on the ground have
3. Id. 1-3.
4. Id. 301-09.
5. Patricia M. Wald, General Radislav Krsti6: A War Crimes Case Study, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHIcs 445, 459 (2003).
6. Id. at 468.
7. Tim Naftali, The Lion in Whimper: Why Didn't We See Saddam's Weakness?, SLATE,
Apr. 5, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2139353. Saddam Hussein may yet prove to be a notable
exception to this trend. See Robert F. Worth, Prosecutors in Hussein Case Tie Him to Order To Kill 148,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2006, at Al. However, the prosecutors in the Hussein trial, like those at Nuremberg,
notably have the rare benefit of full access to Hussein's files after his regime suffered total defeat and
U.S. occupation.
8. Marlise Simons, Case Against Milogevie Is Not Simple To Prove, N.Y. TIMES, July 2,
2001, at A8 (quoting Nancy Paterson, former team legal advisor, Office of the Prosecutor, ICTY).
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to rely on very different kinds of evidence than their predecessors at
Nuremberg and Tokyo. Witness testimony and, increasingly, intelligence
information now play the roles formerly held by captured memoranda and
signed orders.
Advances in intelligence technology, particularly signals surveillance
and satellite reconnaissance, have given prosecutors new tools to document
war crimes and command responsibility where the paper trail leaves off. The
power of such evidence, which might allow judges to be a "fly on the wall" to
a telephone discussion among top leaders as they conspire to commit crimes,
is obvious. One ICTY judge described as "astounding" satellite photography
furnished by the U.S. military that pinpointed down to the minute the
movements of men and transport around Srebrenica.9 This evidence is not,
however, unproblematic. For one, states must be convinced to provide it and
often want assurances that valuable sources and methods will not be
compromised. 10 States providing such evidence may demand that it only be
utilized by the prosecutor, protected from disclosure to the defense, or-if
ultimately used as evidence-presented only in closed, in camera hearings.
This, in turn, presents problems for preserving the openness of international
criminal trials, protecting the defendant's right to know the evidence against
him, and protecting his right to challenge the authenticity of such evidence in
court. These dilemmas are particularly acute for international courts, since the
public often greets them skeptically, especially when egged on by demagogic
defendants. Measures to protect and utilize "secret" evidence can always raise
the specter of show trials. Further, since one of international justice's main
aims is public education and national reconciliation, prosecutors using secret
evidence may win individual battles in court, but lose the broader war of
reforming societies and healing victims. Indeed, Milogevid's sudden death in
March 2006, after more than four years of trial but before the Tribunal could
reach judgment, dramatizes that sometimes only the trial record itself may
exist to serve as history's lasting testament to heinous crimes.
In this Essay, I will argue that because defendants' rights and national
security interests often conflict, international tribunals, including the
9. Patricia M. Wald, The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia Comes
of Age: Some Observations on Day-to-Day Dilemmas of an International Court, 5 WASH. U. J.L. &
POL'Y 87, 101 (2001).
10. Following the ICTY's controversial decision in Prosecutor v. Blaki6, Case No. IT-95-14,
Decision on the Objection of the Republic of Croatia to the Issuance of Subpoena Duces Tecum (July
18, 1997), when the Trial Chamber requested the enforcement of a subpoena for documents against
Croatia despite Croatia's objection on grounds of state secrecy, much ink has been spilled on the
propriety of allowing international tribunals to adjudicate state secrecy claims as grounds for non-
cooperation. See, e.g., Grant Dawson & Mieke Dixon, The Protection of States' National Security
Interests in Cases Before the ICTY: A Descriptive and Prescriptive Analysis of Rule 54 bis of the Rules
and Procedure and Evidence, in THE DYNAMICS OF INTERNATIONAL CRmINAL JUSTICE 95, 112-34
(Hirad Abtahi & Gideon Boas eds., 2006); Matthias Neuner, The Power of International Criminal
Tribunals To Produce Evidence, in NATIONAL SEcURrrY AND INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 163
(Herwig Roggemann & Petar artevid eds., 2002). This Essay focuses on national security evidence that
is voluntarily submitted to international criminal prosecutors, not evidence that parties to such
proceedings may attempt to procure from states through subpoena. In practical terms, I believe that the
voluntary, cooperative model is the most likely way that state secret evidence will come into the hands
of international tribunals and presents often-overlooked problems in its own right.
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International Criminal Court and Iraqi Special Tribunal, must draft clearer
rules to govern the discovery and use of such evidence and work toward
greater overall transparency in rulemaking. Using the ICTY as a case study, I
will examine how tribunals can work to create a flexible procedural regime
that accommodates such evidence without undermining the tribunals' wider
goals. Certainly, a bright-line rule excluding such evidence, simply because a
state may demand some protections for the information, is unnecessary and
would threaten a return to the era of impunity for those who are clever enough
to not leave a paper trail. Frequent capitulation to the often obsessive secrecy
demands of states, however, may do more harm than good, since international
courts depend in large part on maintaining openness and a perception of
fairness to defendants for their legitimacy. Striking the right balance between
these two goals, as the ICTY discovered, is not always easy. In Parts H and
m, I will sketch out a brief history of the ICTY's rulemaking on discovery,
disclosure, and protection of state national security evidence to show the
inevitable political constraints on international tribunals' ability to procure
sensitive information from states. In Part IV, I will examine how ICTY judges
ultimately handled defendants' rights to discovery of confidential material. In
Part V, I will explore some of the consequences of using witness protection
measures and in camera sessions to protect a state's intelligence-derived
evidence during trial. Lastly, in Part VI, I will compare the practice and
procedure of the ICTY with those of the nascent ICC and Iraqi Special
Tribunal, to explore what lessons for international criminal justice have, and
have not, been learned.
II. CREATING A RULES FRAMEWORK FOR NATIONAL SECURITY EVIDENCE
AT THE ICTY
When the ICTY's appointed judges first convened at the Hague in late
November 1993, the Tribunal had no permanent premises, staff, or prosecutor.
Although some judges suggested adjourning until the U.N. General Assembly
provided a semblance of infrastructure, ICTY President and Judge Antonio
Cassese insisted that the work of drafting rules of procedure should begin
immediately, so that the tribunal would be ready by the time the office of the
prosecutor was functioning. " The result was that two months later, on
February 11, 1994, the ICTY adopted 125 rules of procedure, covering some
72 pages. The speed of the undertaking was impressive; by way of
comparison, a committee of American judges and law professors spent four
years drafting the first U.S. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in the early
1940s.' 2 The rules tilted toward embracing the adversarial approach common
to the Anglo-American tradition, perhaps because the Americans provided the
most detailed set of proposals. Unsurprisingly, the rules would be modified
frequently over the years; in 2000 and 2001 alone, ninety-one rules were
11. MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL
WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 66 (1997).
12. Id. at 67.
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amended, seven new rules were adopted, and one was deleted. 13 Nonetheless,
the adopted rules provided a much stronger framework for procedural justice
than the oft-criticized, scanty rules that had governed the Nuremberg
proceedings. 14
The United States was the first party to the rulemaking process to
request incorporating specific protections for national security classified
information that countries might someday share with prosecutors." The
original U.S. draft of proposed rules for the ICTY suggested a sweeping non-
disclosure rule that would allow the Trial Chamber to withhold "a State's
national security information" from the accused, even if that information was
used to support indictment. 16 The United States also recommended protecting
all such materials from mandatory disclosure to the accused-including those
that might be exculpatory or otherwise material to the defense-and did not
expressly forbid such evidence from being used at trial. The U.S. draft rules
suggested that the Trial Chamber could hold ex parte, in camera hearings to
determine whether relevant protected information needed to be disclosed to
the public or the accused and then notify the State accordingly. 17 An
American Bar Association special task force, which reviewed and commented
on the rules proposed by the United States, criticized the breadth of the
suggested non-disclosure rule and urged a tighter definition of "national
security information." The ABA suggested that all information used in
support of an indictment or in trial be disclosed to the accused, and urged the
tribunal to resist using closed sessions to protect secret information. To do
otherwise, warned the ABA, could "seriously impair the credibility and
apparent integrity of the International Tribunal." 18
The rules adopted by the Tribunal in February 1994 took into
consideration some of the American government's concerns regarding
information secrecy, but ultimately contained far fewer broad carve-outs to
13. Gideon Boas, A Code of Evidence and Procedure for International Criminal Law? The
Rules of the ICTY, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE ICTY 1,
5 (Gideon Boas & William Schabas eds., 2003).
14. See, e.g., Kevin Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to
the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials, 14 DICK. J. INT'L L. 57 (1995).
15. Dawson & Dixon, supra note 10, at 111-12. Dawson and Dixon note that the issue of
protecting state's national security evidence was neither raised in the Secretary General's report
regarding the establishment of the Tribunal nor in debate about the Tribunal in the U.N. Security
Council.
16. U.S. Proposal for Rules of Evidence, Rule 8.1.B (Nov. 18, 1993), reprinted in ABA
SECTION OF INT'L LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT ON TBE PROPOSED RULES OF PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE
OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL To ADJUDICATE WAR CRIMAEs IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 72 (1995)
[hereinafter ABA REPORT].
17. U.S. Proposal for Rules of Evidence, Rules 8.2(A) and 17.6(A) (Nov. 18, 1993), reprinted
in ABA REPORT, supra note 16, at 72, 87-89 (proposing that the Tribunal adopt a rule that "[s]tate
national security information cannot be disclosed to the public without the prior approval and consent of
that state," and exempting from disclosure "information protected by a non-disclosure order pursuant to
Rule 8"); see also Rule 8 cmt., reprinted in ABA REPORT, supra note 16, at 87-89 ("Information
provided to the International Tribunal by a State, which the states believes necessary to protect as a
matter of national security ... may initially be reviewed by the Trial Chamber in closed proceedings or
in camera.").
18. Report on the Proposed Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal To
Adjudicate War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia, reprinted in ABA REPORT, supra note 16, at 141-43.
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protect a state's national security information. While the Tribunal did not
choose to have the whole of the prosecutor's file automatically provided to the
defense, it did adopt an expansive disclosure rule, at least by American
standards. This original rule required the prosecutor to share with the
defense-without an explicit exception for state secrets-materials that
supported indictment, statements by the accused, and statements from
prosecution witnesses, as well as any exculpatory information. 19 Mimicking
the U.S. Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the rules also required the
prosecutor to submit to the defense, upon request, "any books, documents,
photographs and tangible items in its custody or control" that would be
"material" to the preparation of the defense. 20 Such a rule reflected the broad
trend, now embraced even in common law countries like England, against
"trial by surprise;" it also helped even out the equality of arms for defendants
who might be less likely to get cooperation on discovery from reluctant
states. However, the rule also threatened to throw open to the defense
information that the prosecutor had no intention of presenting at trial. The
disclosure rule, as adopted, did not even contain a carve-out to allow the
prosecutor to apply for permission to withhold confidential information that
22
might affect a state's security interests. In other words, the prosecutor had
limited ability to offer prior confidentiality guarantees to states that were
considering divulging such information.23
In the months after the initial adoption of the ICTY rules, the U.S.
Department of State suggested numerous amendments and rule changes,
focusing first and foremost on protecting national security information from
disclosure. Noting that the United States (and other states) "may be able to
make available to the Prosecutor sensitive intelligence information for use in
investigations for lead purposes only," the Americans urged that the rules be
amended to give the prosecutor explicit power to enter into binding
agreements with states that would protect secret information. 24 Further,
ignoring the ABA's suggestion, the United States again pressed the ICTY to
allow for the possibility that documents used to support an indictment could
be withheld from the accused. The ICTY eventually conceded on the latter
point, amending the rule on non-disclosure of indictments in January 1995 to
allow a judge or the Trial Chamber to order the withholding of "any particular
document or information" so as to "protect confidential information obtained
19. ICTYR. P. &EVm. 66(A), 68 (Feb. 11, 1994) (on file with author).
20. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(E), with ICTY R. P. & EVID. 66(B) (Feb. 11, 1994) (on
file with author). For a more detailed discussion of the ICTY's rules, see infra Part IV.
21. For an overview of Great Britain's steady move toward greater discovery rights for
defendants, culminating in the 1996 Criminal Procedure and Investigation Act, see Stanley Z. Fisher,
The Prosecutor's Ethical Duty To Seek Exculpatory Evidence in Police Hands: Lessons From England,
68 FORDHAM L. REv. 1379 (2000).
22. ICTY R. P. & EviD. 66 (Feb. 11, 1994) (on file with author).
23. See ICTY R. P. & EvD. 53(B) (Feb. 11, 1994) (on file with author). Rule 53(B) as adopted
in 1994 made no specific mention of withholding national security information, and provided only that
the Tribunal, in consultation with the prosecutor, could order non-disclosure "if satisfied that the making
of such is in the interests of justice." Id.
24. U.S. Comments on Rules Adopted by the Tribunal (May 2, 1994), reprinted in ABA
REPORT, supra note 16, at 170-71.
Protecting National Security Evidence
by the Prosecutor" or otherwise further the interests of justice.25 The ICTY did
not, however, initially amend the rules to include language proposed by the
United States that would have given the prosecutor broad authority to enter
into air-tight, enforceable confidentiality agreements with states in order to
acquire information.26
III. JUSTICE MEETS POLITICS: ADJUSTING THE RULES To ACCOMMODATE
STATE CONCERNS
Unsurprisingly, as the real investigatory and prosecutorial work of the
ICTY got underway in late 1994 and 1995, the rules governing confidentiality
for state-provided intelligence information were tested repeatedly. At the start,
prosecutors discovered that soliciting evidence from states from whom they
had no effective power to compel discovery involved great diplomatic effort.
The first chief prosecutor for the ICTY, Richard Goldstone, described his
early months at the ICTY as ones of globe-trotting and hand-shaking to
convince states to cooperate and share sensitive information with the
prosecutorial team:
Arrangements to receive police information, and, even more so, intelligence information,
required lengthy, complex and detailed negotiations. Again, there was no substitute for
personal visits. Trust and confidence had to be built between the institution and the
government concerned. This could not be achieved without direct contact with the
relevant officials. The necessary agreements required special procedures, including the
building of secure premises to house such confidential documents. The rules of procedure
had to be amended to enable the Prosecutor to accept information in confidence. More
particularly, the Prosecutor had to be allowed to receive "lead" evidence without the
obligation to disclose it to defendants and their legal representatives.
27
By the fall of 1994, the ICTY's rules not only clarified that "lead"
evidence provided in confidence by a state and not intended to be used at trial
does not have to be disclosed to the accused,28 but also added a host of
restrictions to the ICTY's power to compel verification of state confidential
information in the event that the state ultimately consented to the
information's use in court. Under an amended Rule 70, ICTY judges-who,
like civil law judges, may question witnesses and order the production of
additional evidence when desired-were banned outright from ordering a
party to produce "additional evidence received from the person or entity
providing the initial [confidential lead] information." 29 The amended rule also
prohibited the Trial Chamber, "for the purpose of obtaining such additional
evidence, [to] itself summon that person or a representative of that entity as a
witness or order their attendance," and clarified that no witness could be
25. ICTY R. P. & EvD. 53(C).
26. See the discussion in ABA REPORT, supra note 16, at 172, concerning a possible Rule 39
bis that would have provided the prosecutor with the power to enter binding agreements with states and
to have those conditions enforced by the Tribunal through Rule 53 non-disclosure orders.
27. Richard Goldstone, A View from the Prosecution, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 380, 381 (2004).
28. See ICTY R.P. & EVID. 66(C), rev. 3 (Jan. 30, 1995), reprinted in 2 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE
TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAViA: A DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY AND ANALYSIS 41, 69 (Virginia Morris & Michael P. Scharf eds., 1995).
29. ICTY R. P. & EviD. 70(C).
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compelled to answer a question on cross-examination if he declined to answer
on grounds of state secrecy.3 ° The practical effect of such changes was to
allow the prosecutor to offer new assurances to states that a little bit of
cooperation would not make them wholly vulnerable to the whims of Tribunal
judges.
As the Appeals Chamber would later note, the entire purpose of
amending Rule 70 was to encourage states to cooperate with the Tribunal.3'
The Chamber described the rule as "creat[ing] an incentive for such
cooperation by permitting the sharing of information on a confidential basis
and by guaranteeing information providers that the confidentiality of the
information they offer and ... the information's sources will be protected.
3 2
When the United States allowed former UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke
and General Wesley Clark to testify in Milogevi 's trial, it was only after
intense negotiations with prosecutors conducted under Rule 70 terms. 33 In
explaining the hard line that the United States took with the ICTY in the
negotiations, a U.S. official told reporters, "[former officials] either won't
testify or they will have to testify under these rules .... It is a matter of
intelligence collection and a fear that sources and methods of obtaining
information could be jeopardized if Holbrooke or others have to testify in
open court." 34 Ultimately both Holbrooke and Clark testified in closed
sessions with two U.S. government officials present, and the United States had
permission to redact any testimony that it felt could compromise national
security.35
Given the U.S. government's sometimes tepid embrace of international
justice and its undisputed power as the number one intelligence collector in
the world, the ICTY's willingness to accommodate its demands is hardly
unsurprising. Few could doubt that the United States was not making idle
threats when it suggested it would not allow Holbrooke or Clark to testify if
the government's terms were not fully met. Even when the American
government has adopted an officially friendly attitude toward an international
tribunal, as in the case of the ICTY, skeptics in Congress in particular have
pressured the administration to take a strong line on protecting U.S. witnesses
and evidence. In hearings about international criminal justice, members of
Congress frequently invoked the risk such courts pose to intelligence sources
and methods. United States Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes David
Scheffer had to reassure Congress in 2000 that intelligence sharing with the
ICTY only took place under a "very rigorous procedure" that was "dominated
30. ICTY R. P. & EviD. 70(C)-(D).
31. Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54-A, Public Version of the Confidential
Decision on the Interpretation and Application of Rule 70, 19 (Oct. 23, 2002) [hereinafter Milogevid,
Confidential Decision].
32. Id.
33. See Ian Black, Wesley Clark Testifies in Secret at Milosevic Trial, GUARDIAN (London),
Dec. 16, 2003, at 11; Closed Session Ordered for Envoy's War Crimes Testimony, AUSTRALIAN, June
14, 2002, at 9 [hereinafter Closed Session]; Elaine Sciolino, Clark Testifies Against Milosevic at Hague
Tribunal, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 16, 2003, at A3.
34. Closed Session, supra note 33.
35. Sciolino, supra note 33.
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by interagency checks and balances."' 36 At a hearing on the ICTY and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, one attorney urged members of
Congress not to adopt a critical view of cooperation with the ICTY, saying:
[W]hen we decide in the name of international justice to prosecute someone, we ought to
have the backbone to stand behind that. If that means producing information and
producing witnesses, I have heard all the talk about what a terrible thing it would be ....
Why is that? ... [I]f we are not prepared to do that, then we should not be convicting
these people.
37
In the face of such widespread criticism and skepticism, the ICTY's
rules came to reflect the cold reality of the Tribunal's dependence on state
cooperation to obtain certain kinds of crucial witnesses and evidence.
Compelling production of documents is not a realistic option for international
prosecutors who often neither know what intelligence evidence states may
have collected, nor have any realistic means of enforcing production orders
against powerful states. As one of the ICTY Trial Chambers observed,
without the guarantees of confidentiality provided by Rule 70, it would be
"almost impossible to envisage this Tribunal, of which the Prosecution is an
integral organ, being able to fulfill its functions. ' 38 International criminal
courts, in being almost wholly dependent on states to provide this kind of
crucial evidence, are particularly vulnerable to pressures for protection and
secrecy. Although the United States provides the most dramatic example of
state hesitation to provide secret evidence to international tribunals without
protections, other powerful Western states, such as the United Kingdom and
France, have expressed similar concerns in other fora. 39 Rulemaking in
international criminal tribunals will therefore almost inevitably reflect the
push-and-pull of politics, with powerful states holding disproportionate
power. The ultimate balance struck between these competing demands reflects
not only on the fairness of a particular trial but also on the legitimacy of
international criminal law. The following two sections explore how the ICTY
judges, faced with the formidable task of expounding the meaning of these
rules, attempted to resolve some of the special problems posed by national
security evidence.
36. The International Criminal Court: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int'l Rel., 106th
Cong. 51 (2000) (statement of David L. Scheffer, Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S.
Dep't of State).
37. The U.N. Criminal Tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda: International Justice, or Show
of Justice?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Int'l Rel., 107th Cong. 137 (2002) (statement of Larry A.
Hammond, Attn'y, Osborn Maledon, P.A.), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/
intlrel/hfa77896.000/hfa77896_0f.htm.
38. Milogevid, Confidential Decision, supra note 31, 19 (quoting Prosecutor v. Brdanin &
Tali, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Public Version of the Confidential Decision on the Alleged Illegality of
Rule 70 of May 6, 2002, 18 (May 23, 2002)).
39. See Donald K. Piragoff, Protection of National Security Information, in THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE 270, 275-84 (Roy S. Lee ed.,
1999), for a thorough explication of British, French, and American negotiating positions on national
security evidence during the drafting of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.
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IV. WORKING OUT THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHT TO DISCOVERY OF PROTECTED
INFORMATION
As discussed, the United States devoted particular energy to securing
procedural rules that would shield confidential information from not just the
public, but also the accused. The discovery rules of the ICTY broadly divide
the prosecutor's files into three categories of materials, subject to varying
levels of disclosure to the defense: (1) basic, threshold information, such as
the materials that supported indictment, prior statements of the accused, and
prior statements of prosecution witnesses; (2) exculpatory information or
information that would tend to mitigate the guilt of the accused;41 and (3)
tangible materials that would be "material" to the preparation of the defense,
such as "any books, documents, photographs and tangible items in [the
prosecutor's] custody or control."42 The first two categories were subject to
mandatory disclosure under Rules 66(A) and 68, respectively, while the third
category was subject to disclosure only if the defense agreed to provide
reciprocal disclosure under Rule 67(C). The rules of procedure provided an
exception to disclosure for information that was provided to the prosecutor on
a confidential basis by a state, but in the early years of the Tribunal, this
exception only clearly applied to the third category of materials, those tangible
items that would be material to the preparation of the defense.43 One of the
problems repeatedly faced by ICTY judges was whether this exception to
disclosure was broad enough to ensure the proper functioning of the Tribunal,
achieving the right balance of securing state cooperation without overly
compromising defendants' rights.
As the work of the Tribunal progressed, it did not take long for the
judges to conclude-first through decisions from the bench, and then through
changes to the procedural rules-that even materials subject to mandatory
disclosure under Rule 66(A), such as the prior statements of the accused,
could be withheld on grounds of national security.44 This became particularly
important as the Tribunal struggled to define exactly what constituted "prior
statements" of the accused. Because not all defendants were willing to subject
themselves to reciprocal disclosure under Rule 67(C), they often sought to
define broadly those materials that were subject to unilateral, mandatory
disclosure by the prosecution. In the Blaki6 case, the defendant even
attempted to procure his own military orders as commander by labeling them
his "prior statements." Anticipating this problem, the prosecution had
40. ICTY R.P. & EviD. 66(A).
41. ICTY R.P. & EvID. 68.
42. ICTY R.P. & EVID. 66(B).
43. See ICTY R.P. & EviD., 66, rev. 6 (Oct. 6, 1995) (specifying that the prosecution could
apply for relief from disclosure under sub-rule (C) of materials subject to the optional, triggered
disclosure under sub-rule (B)).
44. ICTY R.P. & EvID. 66(A) ("The Prosecutor shall make available to the defence ... all
prior statements obtained by the Prosecutor from the accused or from prosecution witnesses.").
45. Prosecutor v. Bla~kid, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Sanctions for the Prosecutor's Failure to Comply with Sub-rule 66(A) of the Rules and the Decision of
27 January 1997 Compelling the Production of All Statements of the Accused (July 15, 1998)
[hereinafter Bla~kid, Sanctions Decision].
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suggested earlier in the case that the only materials that should be considered
"statements" are "the official statements taken under oath or, at least, s ned
and recognized by the accused as an exact and precise interpretation." The
Trial Chamber initially rejected this interpretation and ordered the prosecution
to surrender immediately "all the previous statements of the accused ...
whether collected by the Prosecution or originating from any other source."
47
In the face of Bla~kid's request for his own military orders, however, the
Chamber retreated, eventually arriving at a definition not that far off from the
prosecutor's original suggestion. Henceforward, the Chamber declared that
the term "must be understood to refer to all statements made by the accused
during questioning in any type of judicial proceeding ...but only such
statements. 48
When the Trial Chamber handed down its first, more expansive ruling
on the meaning of "prior statements of the accused" in the Blagki6 case, it did
pause to note that the prosecution could apply for relief from disclosure under
the terms of Rule 66(C) to protect a state's confidential information. 49
Notably, the Trial Chamber's construction was not supported by the text of
the rule itself, which at the time of the Blagki6 decision applied the Rule 66(C)
confidentiality protections only to tangible materials and documents requested
under the reciprocal disclosure requirements of Rule 66(B), not materials
subject to mandatory initial disclosure. The rule, however, was ultimately
amended in November 1999 to incorporate this aspect of the Blaki6 ruling,
thereafter making clear that a prosecutor could apply for Rule 66(C) relief for
any of the materials discoverable under Rule 66, whether the materials were
part of the threshold, mandatory disclosure or only part of the optional,
triggered disclosure. 50 Therefore, by 1999, the ICTY had effectively narrowed
the defendants' discovery rights in two key ways: first, by favoring a strict
definition of what constitutes a "prior statement" so as to exclude materials
like captured documents or intercepted communications, and second, by
extending the protections for state confidentiality to cover all such materials.
These protections ensured that many kinds of intelligence information in the
prosecutors' files would not be open to disclosure and gave' prosecutors the
ability to reassure states that protection of state confidentiality was among the
Tribunal's top priorities.
The evolution of the Tribunal's rule on the mandatory disclosure of
exculpatory evidence followed a similar trajectory, but one that is far more
problematic for defendants' core rights. Rules requiring the disclosure of prior
statements of the accused or materials relevant to the preparation of the
defense are reasonable attempts to even out the "equality of arms" between
defendants and prosecutors, and therefore are subject to reasonable exceptions
46. Prosecutor v. BlaUki, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Decision on the Production of Discovery
Materials, 3 (Jan. 27, 1997) [hereinafter Blagkid, Discovery Decision].
47. Id. 137.
48. B31akid, Sanctions Decision, supra note 45.
49. Blaikid, Discovery Decision, supra note 46, 39.
50. Compare ICTY R.P. & Evm. 66, rev. 16 (July 2, 1999), with ICTY R.P. & EVID. 66, rev.
17 (Nov. 17, 1999).
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on grounds of state secrecy. A rule requiring the prosecutor to share with the
accused any information that suggests actual innocence, however, is
fundamental to notions of due process under many national legal systems and
international law. 5' Allowing the prosecutor to quash exculpatory evidence
implicates the basic fairness of any criminal proceeding. The ICTY's original
rule on disclosure of exculpatory evidence was accordingly quite broad,
covering any material "known to the Prosecutor, which in any way tends to
suggest the innocence or mitigate the guilt of the accused., 52 Indeed, in 1995,
under pressure from non-governmental organizations, this right was expanded
to include mandatory disclosure of any material that might "affect the
credibility of prosecution evidence," such as special agreements with
prosecution witnesses.5 3 The rule did not provide any specific exemption for
state confidential information.
The first erosion of this clear right came, again, in the Blaiki6 case, and
ultimately found codification in the Tribunal's rules. The primary concern in
the Blagki6 ruling was how specifically a request for exculpatory evidence
must be phrased. The defense in general is unlikely to know the nature of the
evidence in the hands of the prosecutor and thus can only make a broad
request under Rule 68; at the same time, a general query absent some showing
of a prima facie case that the prosecutor is, in fact, withholding such evidence
would allow the defense to obtain broad disclosure while ducking the
mutuality requirement of Rule 66(B).54 The Trial Chamber ultimately sought
to resolve this quandary by suggesting that the defense needed to present
specific requests for information to the prosecutor, who would then be
obligated to state whether she possessed such materials, whether these
materials contained exculpatory evidence, and whether the prosecutor
believed the confidentiality of any exculpatory materials needed to be
protected on the basis of a state's national security. 5 This latter point
indicates that the Trial Chamber believed it would be permissible to withhold
exculpatory evidence to protect state confidentiality, even though no text
supported this conclusion. Ultimately, in 2003, the Tribunal codified the
substance of this ruling into the rules of procedure, allowing the prosecutor to
apply in camera for relief from disclosure of exculpatory materials as long as
51. See, e.g., Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (establishing defendant's right to
exculpatory information as an element of U.S. constitutional due process of law); R. v. Brown, (1995) 1
Crim. App. 191, 198 (holding that under English common law, where "the police and prosecution
control the investigatory process, an accused's right to fair disclosure is an inseparable part of his right
to a fair trial," including the right to receive exculpatory information); Jespers v. Belgium, App. No.
8403/78, 22 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 100, 125 (1981) (Commission report) (holding that the
prosecution's failure to disclose exculpatory information, including information that would tend to
undermine the credibility of prosecution witnesses, "is a flagrant violation of the rights of the defence").
52. ICTY R.P. & EviD. 68 (Feb. 11, 1994) (on file with author).
53. See ICTY R.P. & EviD. 68, rev. 6 (Oct. 6, 1995); see also Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights, Fairness to Defendants at the International Criminal Court (Working Paper, 1996), available at
http://www.ciaonet.orgwps/lch02/#16.
54. Renee Pruitt, Discovery: Mutual Disclosure, Unilateral Disclosure, and Non-Disclosure
Under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EvIDENcE IN
HONOUR OF GABRIELLE KIRK McDONALD 305,310 (Richard May et al. eds., 2001).
55. Blaikid, Discovery Decision, supra note 46, 156.
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the prosecutor at least first undertook "reasonable steps" to secure the state's
permission to disclose.
56
This creeping erosion of defendants' rights to discovery, first through
judicial decisions unsupported by the rules and then through changes to the
rules themselves, demonstrates that international tribunals have a hard time
holding the line on defendants' rights in the face of state demands for secrecy
guarantees. The ICTY's decision to grant an exception to disclosure on
national security grounds even for exculpatory information is troubling. Under
U.S. law, for example, defendants' discovery rights regarding classified
information are governed by the Classified Information Procedures Act
(CIPA). Under CIPA, the defendant may make requests for items "material"
to the defense as well as exculpatory information per the normal processes of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. However, on motion by the United
States and a sufficient showing to the court, the court may authorize the
government to delete specified items of classified information, substitute a
summary of the information, or substitute a statement admitting relevant facts
that the classified information would tend to prove.5 8 Notably, CIPA does not
permit the deletion of discoverable material, but rather the deletion of
nondiscoverable material in a document that also contains discoverable
information. The ABA, in its original review of the ICTY's proposed rules,
suggested a CIPA-like procedure that might allow classified information to be
disclosed to the accused in "summarized or edited form" if the accused would
not be prejudiced by such summarization.59 Although such a procedure might
not be wholly transplantable to international tribunals, the ICTY's discovery
rules would be less concerning if they included at least a CIPA-like summary
option where disclosure is mandatory and implicates the rights of the
defendant more strongly. Indeed, although it is not explicitly provided for in
the rules, it seems that the Trial Chamber did allow for some kinds of
redacting of information before it was passed to the defense, although it is
unclear whether this redacting was done to protect state secret information or
for some other purpose.
60
A final question of procedural fairness in discovery concerns how the
Tribunal handles requests from the prosecutor to protect materials from
disclosure. The rules as drafted allow the prosecutor to apply to the Tribunal
sitting in camera for relief from the obligation to disclose; when making this
application the prosecution submits to the Trial Chamber (but only the Trial
61Chamber) the information that it seeks to keep confidential. In a critical
56. ICTY R.P. & EviD. 68, rev. 30 (Apr. 14, 2004).
57. Pub. L. No. 96-456, 94 Stat. 2025 (1980) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. app. §§ 1-
16 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004)).
58. 18 U.S.C.A. app. § 4 (West 2000 & Supp. 2004); see Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Critical
Review of the Classified Information Procedures Act, 13 AM. J. CRIM. L. 277, 291 n.73 (1986); see also
Note, Secret Evidence in the War on Terror, 118 HARV. L. REv. 1962, 1962-63 (2005).
59. See ABA REPORT, supra note 16, at 142.
60. See Prosecutor v. Jovica Stanisid, Case No. IT-03-69-PT, Decision on the Defense Motion
To Receive Hard Copies of Rule 66 Material (Mar. 11, 2005) (noting that information would be
available to the defense "subject to redacting").
61. ICTY R.P. & Evm. 66(C).
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decision in 1996, the Trial Chamber found that while the prosecutor may
submit the confidential information itself to the Chamber ex parte in order to
obtain a decision on non-disclosure, this does not mean that the Chamber will
hold ex parte hearings on arguments for non-disclosure. 62 The Tribunal
insisted that "ex parte proceedings undermine the basic foundation of the
adversarial system of justice," and therefore, "the Chamber must guarantee
hearings with both parties present." 63 In other words, the defense is allowed to
make its case in favor of disclosure, although obviously its ability to make
effective argument will be hamstrung by its lack of access to the materials in
question. The Tribunal, of course, could not resolve this conundrum, but at the
very least the ban on ex parte hearings encourages the prosecution to be
judicious in its requests for non-disclosure and allows the defense to keep
some tabs on the frequency with which such protections are invoked.
Although there seems to be no way around some kind of ex parte
submission of information that the prosecutor wishes to protect, stronger
procedural safeguards might nonetheless help preserve the defendant's right to
a fair trial. The ICTY judges no doubt consider themselves to be trained
professionals who can compartmentalize information that has not been
properly admitted into evidence, but the potential power of certain kinds of
secret evidence certainly would put their skills to the test. Shocking bits of
intercept evidence that have been used in open court have been unforgettable;
the Krsti6 intercept cited at the outset of this Essay-although ultimately ruled
inadmissible on other procedural grounds-was quoted repeatedly in news
accounts and found its way into a documentary. 64 Even ICTY Judge Patricia
Wald apparently had a hard time blotting out the memory of the intercept; she
quoted it in a post-mortem article on the Krsti6 trial even as she noted that the
evidence was thrown out. 65 It is not unreasonable to ask whether the provision
of such information to the trial judges for the purpose of adjudicating
discovery motions, when the prosecution has no intention of using the
information at trial-indeed, because it might be utterly inadmissible in any
case-could prejudice the Chamber against the accused. One way of
strengthening defendants' rights might be to have all discovery issues handled
by a pre-trial or magistrate judge who would not play a role in the actual trial.
The ICTY has already tacked more strongly toward creating such a quasi-
inquisitorial procedure by having pre-trial judges manage aspects of
discovery. In this particular context, that decision seems wise. With discovery
likely to serve as the primary battleground on which struggles between state
secrecy and defendants' rights will be played out, the judges who sit in the
Trial Chamber need to stay far from the fray.
62. Prosecutor v. Blagkid, Case No. IT-95-14, Decision Rejecting the Request of the
Prosecutor for Ex Parte Proceedings (Sept. 18, 1996).
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., TRIUMIPH OF EVIL (SENSE News Agency 2001), available at http://www.sense-
agency.com/en/multimedia/index.php?mulkat=2; Marlise Simons, Trial Reopens Pain of 1995 Bosnian
Massacre, N.YTIMES, Nov. 7, 2000, at A3.
65. Wald, supra note 5, at 461 n.46.
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V. PUTTING INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION ON TRIAL AT THE ICTY
Although much of the rulemaking discussed above focused on how to
protect information from disclosure to anyone other than the prosecutor, some
intelligence-derived information proved so valuable that the prosecution
convinced the state to allow its introduction as evidence in court. This opened
up a different Pandora's box, one which was not well addressed through the
rules of procedure and which the ICTY judges were largely forced to resolve
for themselves. Should such evidence be admissible? If so, how can
defendants meaningfully challenge its authenticity? And how much should the
information, even if shared with the accused, be protected from public
disclosure through closed, in camera hearings and other methods? The ICTY's
rules generally gave judges wide latitude to determine the admissibility of
evidence based on its probative value to the trial. Unlike in national systems
where jury trials predominate, the Tribunal, which conducted all trials by
bench, did not have to worry about the layman's ability to follow limiting
instructions or weigh evidence against its reliability. As a consequence, the
Tribunal adopted few blanket exclusionary rules. It never agreed to be bound
by national rules of evidence and committed itself only to excluding evidence
obtained "by means contrary to internationally protected human rights." 
66
These loose rules of evidence virtually ensured that intelligence-derived
information would be introduced during trial and that defendants could
challenge admission on grounds of illegality, hearsay, or unreliability.
Most well-developed national law systems, as well as several
international human rights treaties, recognize a basic "right to privacy" which
is violated by typical intelligence-gathering methods, such as intercepting an
individual's communications without warrant or other legal approval. In
most states in the former Yugoslavia, for example, evidence obtained from
electronic surveillance cannot be used in court. 68 Defendants in the ICTY,
therefore, unsurprisingly sought the exclusion of all "illegally obtained
evidence," arguing that it was legally no different than evidence obtained by
torture. This theory was tested prominently in Prosecutor v. Brdanin, when
the accused tried to block the introduction into evidence of telephone
conversation intercepts recorded both before and during the war by the
Bosnian Ministry of Interior, which at the time was under the control of the
Bosnian Muslim Alija Delamustafi&.69 Brdanin argued that the recordings
66. ICTY R.P. & Evum. 95 (Feb. 11, 1994) (on file with author). The rule was amended in
1997 to drop any explicit reference to "international human rights" and instead limited itself to
excluding evidence where "its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of
the proceedings." ICTY R.P. & EvrD. 95, rev. 12 (Oct. 20 & Nov. 12, 1997). However, judges continued
to consider violations of international human rights as informative to their interpretation of Rule 95. See
Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on the Defence "Objection to Intercept
Evidence," 9f 29-31, 61 (Oct. 3, 2003) thereinafter Brdanin, Evidence Decision].
67. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 17(1), entered into force
Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with
his privacy, family, home or correspondence .... ").
68. David Holley, Kosovo Serbs Fear Day They'll Have To Walk Alone, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 24,
2002, at A10.
69. Brdanin, Evidence Decision, supra note 66, 6.
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made before the war, at least, violated domestic law, and further tried to
invoke the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and
the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to prove that his right to
privacy had been violated by the interception of his calls.70 The Tribunal
recognized this as effectively a back-door way of trying to force national
evidence standards onto the ICTY, held that the right to privacy guaranteed by
the ICCPR and ECHR is not absolute-particularly in wartime-and that in
any case, national laws by no means universally exclude illegally obtained
evidence. 7' Therefore, the intercepts, even those collected before the war,
were admissible.
Although the Trial Chamber in the Brdanin case undertook a fairly
detailed analysis of various domestic and international laws concerning the
admissibility of illegally obtained evidence, ultimately its decision was based
more on practicality than legal principle. The Trial Chamber conceded that its
mission was "to adjudicate serious violations of international law," and that in
light of this heavy burden, it would "be utterly inappropriate to exclude
relevant evidence due to procedural considerations, as long as the fairness of
the trial is guaranteed., 72 Another Trial Chamber noted in a very similar case
that the primary role of exclusionary rules in domestic law is to punish over-
reaching by law enforcement, something the ICTY had little power to
influence and which was, in any case, not its primary duty. 73 Some
commentators have criticized the Tribunal's interpretation of relevant human
rights law as well as its lax approach to admitting such evidence, calling the
Tribunal's "selective, self-justifying approach" to international evidentiary
rules one that had the arguable effect of elevating the "lowest common
denominator" legal rule.74 However, given that the ICTY itself is a distinct
entity not related to the national police and intelligence forces that gathered
this material, such concerns seem overstated, and a broad proscription on
introducing otherwise credible evidence intercepted in violation of the law
would further neither privacy nor justice.
Because ICTY defendants failed to get intercept evidence excluded from
their proceedings, their next best defense was typically to attack the credibility
of the evidence itself, insisting that the recordings were manipulated,
inaccurate, or badly transcribed. Upon hearing the intercept transcribed at the
beginning of this Essay, General Krstid told the Trial Chamber that it was
"rigged," a "one hundred per cent montage," and that "I did not recognise the




73. Prosecutor v. Kordi6 & (terkez, Case No. IT-95-14/2T, Transcript of Hearing, 13671-72
(Feb. 2, 2000) ("It's not the duty of this Tribunal to discipline armies or anything of that sort. Its duty is
to determine whether the accused is guilty or not .... I'm not accepting that we are approving or
disapproving the conduct. All we are deciding is whether this evidence is admissible under Rule 95.").
74. GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONALIZED CRAINAL PROCEEDINGS 237 (2005).
75. Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Transcript of Heaing, 6809-6810 (Nov. 1,
2000).
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Because intercepts are recorded for intelligence purposes-unlike law
enforcement surveillance, which is carried out with a constant eye to
documenting and preserving the chain of evidence so that the materials may
be used at a future trial-these claims are not necessarily specious. Most of
the Krsti6 intercepts came from the work of professional and amateur Bosnian
Army signalmen, who would record conversations that they thought
"relevant," transcribe them by hand in schoolboy-type notebooks, make their
best effort at identifying participants, and then send both tapes and notebooks
76to Army archives. No doubt good faith efforts at identification and
transcription were usually made, but reliability is hardly guaranteed. Further,
the conversations themselves were often laden with "code" terminology that
was subject to differing interpretations. For example, the prosecutor argued in
the Krsti6 case that references to "distributing parcels" were in fact references
to executions of Bosnian Muslim prisoners, an interpretation the Trial
Chamber accepted but the Appeals Chamber did not feel was proven.
77
In the case of the Krsti6 recordings, the Trial Chamber did undertake a
fairly extensive effort in open court to verify the authenticity of the intercepts
and their transcriptions. The Office of the Prosecutor put together an entire
"intercept project" of analysts, investigators, translators and others, who
collected, assembled, analyzed, and translated the material from its original
Serbo-Croatian to check its accuracy. 78 Although conceding that the intercepts
could never be perfect, the intercept project team cross-checked transcripts
against each other when more than one soldier had recorded the same
conversation and spot-checked verifiable information against data gleaned
from satellite sources and other documentation. The prosecution also called
numerous Bosnian army soldiers into court to authenticate their handwriting
on the record and submitted some of the key notebooks themselves into
evidence.79 Ultimately, though, verifying each individual conversation proved
nearly impossible, so the Trial Chamber could only conclude that the
transcripts were reliable in a general sense, arguing that it was impossible
given the "level of documentable detail [that the transcripts] could have been
completely manufactured by the Bosnian Muslim interceptors. '80 While the
work of the intercept project was impressive and no doubt largely reliable, it
was also left entirely in the hands of the prosecution team and represented
largely an ad hoc response to an unanticipated problem. It did not establish
clear guidelines for handling such issues in the future and forced the judges to
rely on the fairness and diligence of the prosecutor's work.
The collaborative relationship between the Trial Chamber and the
prosecution team in analyzing and verifying intelligence information
highlights one of the key differences between an international tribunal like the
ICTY and truly adversarial criminal legal systems, like those in the United
76. See Wald, supra note 5, at 460.
77. See Prosecutor v. Krstid, Case No. IT-98-33-A, Judgment of the Appeals Chamber, 76
(Apr. 19, 2004).
78. Krstid, Trial Judgment, supra note 2, 106.
79. Wald, supra note 5, at 460.
80. Krstid, Trial Judgment, supra note 2, J 106-17.
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States or Great Britain. Although the ICTY's criminal procedure largely
tracked the adversarial model by incorporating a party-driven sequence of
examination-in-chief, cross-examination, re-examination, rebuttal and
rejoinder, it also utilized some kinds of judge-driven presentation of evidence
and questioning that is common to civil law systems. 1 Therefore, judges and
the prosecutor's office often seemed to be working in tandem to authenticate
particularly problematic pieces of evidence, like the Krstid or Milogevi6
signals intercepts, in ways that might seem less familiar to adversarial law
practioners. Given the international checks and balances on tribunals like the
ICTY, however-where no one national party controls the intelligence
gathering efforts, the prosecution team, and the judicial process collectively-
a measure of trust and collaboration seems more appropriate than it might in a
national law context. Realistically, only the prosecutor's office is likely to
have the knowledge, resources and staffing to analyze and cross-check a
mound of raw intelligence data. As long as the prosecutor's office undertakes
reasonable efforts to make its methodology transparent, such efforts do not
pose a substantial problem for defendants' rights.
Of course, the Tribunal was not always as fortunate as it was in the
Krstid case, where it had a government that was willing to surrender the
intelligence-derived information to the prosecutor and allow it to be presented
in open court. Krstid apparently foolishly communicated over open signals,
and therefore revealing the interceptions in court threatened neither sources
nor methods of intelligence collection. In Milogevid's trial, more of the
intercepts introduced into evidence likely came from Western intelligence
agencies, which are decidedly more adamant about protecting sources and
82methods. Further, some of the individuals called before the Tribunal to
identify voices or corroborate intelligence may have been working as covert
assets within Serbia, and thus could not testify without exposing themselves
and their methods. In December 2003 the Tribunal preliminarily accepted into
evidence en masse 245 intercepts, based on testimony of a single witness
known as B-1793 who testified in closed session as to their authenticity; these
were later fully admitted into evidence after the court hired its own expert to
spot-check fifteen of them for accuracy and tampering.8 3 During another key
81. See Patrick L. Robinson, Rough Edges in the Alignment of Legal Systems in the
Proceedings at the ICTY, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1037 (2005), for a description of how the ICTY
incorporated aspects of the different legal models and some of the conflicts of law that have arisen as a
result.
82. Of course, it is hard to determine the exact provenance of many of the intercepts used at
Milogevid's trial, since these sessions were often conducted in camera. However, ICTY Deputy
Prosecutor Graham Blewitt has said that both the American and British governments provided intercepts
and other intelligence information to aid in the Milogevid case, although he complained that some of the
key evidence could not be used in court. See Simons, supra note 8. Similarly, Chief Prosecutor Carla
Del Ponte noted in testimony to the U.S. Congress that the American government had provided the
prosecutor's office with "transcripts of conversations . . . of Milogevid, of Karadlid," and that
"[slometimes we have success" in getting the U.S. government to authorize their use at trial, and
"sometimes we have not." Bringing Justice to Southeast Europe: Briefing of the U.S. Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, 108th Cong. 4 (2003) (statement of Carla Del Ponte, Chief
Prosecutor of the ICTY) [hereinafter Bringing Justice to Southeast Europe].
83. See Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Second Decision on Admissibility of
Intercepted Communications (Feb. 9, 2004). After Milogevid failed to respond to the court's request, his
Protecting National Security Evidence
point of the trial, the prosecution had to rely on yet another protected witness,
C-061, to verify the voices of various Serbian government officials who could
be heard conversing by phone with Milogevid. Over the course of a week of
testimony, C-061, who was said to have met both Milogevid and Radovan
Karadlid personally, identified voices in more than 50 intercepted telephone
conversations presented as evidence at the trial. 84 Skeptics-perhaps the
defendants but particularly the public-had no meaningful ability to assess the
reliability or accuracy of this information.
The procedures used at the Milogevi6 trial raise unique questions about
the propriety of using closed sessions or witness protection measures in the
name of national security. Closed sessions and non-disclosure of witnesses'
identities to the public and the media are familiar to most national law systems
and do not in any specific sense jeopardize the fairness of a trial. Neither
Article 14 of the ICCPR, nor Article 6 of the EHCR, nor other similar
instruments consider closed trials to be a violation of the rights of the accused,
even if the entire proceeding is held in camera.85 Public trials do, however,
serve an important educational purpose, by helping people understand how the
law is applied to facts that constitute crimes, acting as a check on "framed"
trials, and giving the public a chance to suggest changes to the law or justice
system.86 In the case of international criminal tribunals like the ICTY, where
the law and procedure remain very much a "work in progress" and widespread
public acceptance of the legitimacy of the verdicts is half the battle, over-
reliance on closed sessions does long-term damage to the court's broader
goals. Milogevi6 in particular became adept at manipulating perceptions of
unfairness when the Tribunal held in camera sessions. As the Trial Chamber
prepared to go into closed session to hear the testimony of a protected witness
verifying various intercepts, Milogevid interrupted to attack the Tribunal while
his words would still appear on record:
Milogevi6: Well, I would like to say while we're still in public session that I
categorically oppose this kind of practice, hearing some kind of secret witnesses. The
example of yesterday shows this the best, because you saw yourself that this witness was
not-
Judge May: No. We've made these decisions. It's not a matter for argument.
87
Chief Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte admitted to a U.S. congressional
committee in May 2003 that the use of closed sessions in the Milogevi6 trial
was taking a toll and that "our judges from the trial chamber are hesitant to
amici chose fifteen intercepts for outside verification. Based on the results by the court's expert that
showed no evidence of tampering, the court finally admitted all relevant intercepts into evidence.
Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Final Decision on Admissibility of Intercepted
Communications (June 14, 2004).
84. Prosecutors Play Tape of an Intercepted Call at Milogevi's Trial, N.Y. TIMs, Nov. 23,
2002, at A5.
85. Florence Mumba, Ensuring a Fair Trial Whilst Protecting Victims and Witnesses-
Balancing of Interests?, in ESSAYS ON ICTY PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN HONOUR OF GABRI.LE
KIRK MCDONALD, supra note 54, at 359, 365.
86. Id.
87. Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Transcript of Hearing, 30096-97 (Dec. 4,
2003).
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accept closed sessions, because Milogevid is complaining every time he is
asking to have closed sessions ...."88
While closed sessions and witness protection measures were
contemplated from the start of the ICTY, these rules were largely written to
help the court protect witnesses' privacy and keep them safe from local
retaliation. 9 Women who survived rape or sexual assault might find
themselves retraumatized as social outcasts in their home communities if their
status as victims was known. Further, in parts of Yugoslavia where relations
between ethnic groups remain tense and some accused war criminals are
considered to be hometown heroes, public cooperation with the Tribunal
could expose witnesses, their families, and even their towns to retribution and
violence. 91 In the Tadi6 case, the Trial Chamber decided that "any curtailment
of the accused's right to a public hearing is justified by a genuine fear for the
safety of witness[es]" and urged that the Tribunal explicitly balance the
interests of the witness with the public and the accused. 92 In the Brdanin case,
the Trial Chamber implicitly acknowledged that closed sessions and witness
protection undermine the perceived fairness of the trial, and therefore found
that a mere expression of fear was not sufficient to support protective
measures, but rather that the prosecution must show a real basis for the fear of
violence.
93
While the Tribunal seems to have worked out an intelligible standard to
govern the use of measures such as face and voice scrambling, pseudonyms,
and closed sessions to protect genuinely vulnerable witnesses, the propriety of
and standards for applying these same measures purely to protect a state's
national security-classified information was less clear. Certainly, General
Clark, who testified in the Milogevi6 trial in closed session, had no genuine
fear for his safety. Rule 79, which governed closed sessions, provided only
three bases for the Trial Chamber to exclude the public and the press from
trial proceedings: public order and morality, the safety and security of victims
or witnesses, and the protection of the interests of justice.94 The first two bases
were clearly intended to be invoked only to protect truly vulnerable witnesses,
leaving the Trial Chamber only the vague reason of "protecting the interests of
justice" as grounds for closing trials to protect state secrets. Further, Rule 79
explicitly provided that "the Trial Chamber shall make public the reasons for
its order '' 5 to close the chamber, something which proved difficult or self-
defeating in the case of state secrecy. Indeed, when the prosecution in the
88. Bringing Justice to Southeast Europe, supra note 82, at 10.
89. See, e.g., ICTY R. P. & EviD. 69 (providing that the Trial Chamber may "order the non-
disclosure of the identity of a victim or witness who may be in danger or at risk until such person is
brought under the protection of the Tribunal"); ICTY R. P. & EviD. 75 (providing that the Judge or
Chamber may "order appropriate measures for the privacy and protection of victims and witnesses").
90. See Mumba, supra note 85, at 361.
91. Id. at 360.
92. Prosecutor v. Dugko Tadid, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion
Requesting Protective Measures for Witness "R," 6 (July 31, 1996) (emphasis added).
93. Prosecutor v. Brdanin and Talid, Case No. IT-99-36-PT, Decision on Motion by
Prosecution for Protective Measures, 31 (July 3, 2000).
94. ICTY R. P. & EvnI. 79.
95. Id.
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Milogevi trial applied for protective measures for a witness known as B-1717,
the only reasons given publicly were the "particular security risks attaching to
the witness and the important nature of the testimony it is said he will give;"
on this basis, the Trial Chamber concluded that protective measures would be
appropriate and consistent with the rights of the accused.96 Because the judges
undoubtedly conducted their analysis on the basis of information about the
witness that is not publicly disclosed, it is hard to evaluate their reasoning.
Undoubtedly, measures such as closed sessions and non-disclosure of
witness identities ensure greater state cooperation where sensitive intelligence
information is concerned, which in turn helps the Tribunal secure access to
vital evidence that can support convictions for heinous crimes. The ICTY's
judges and prosecutors were admirably not cavalier about seeking protective
measures on behalf of state secrecy; Carla Del Ponte even complained to the
U.S. Congress that closing the session for Clark and Holbrooke was
unnecessary, since "both are authors of books" that discussed the very issues
to be covered in testimony. 97 Nonetheless, clear standards for when such
measures are and are not appropriate could help legitimize these decisions in
the eyes of the public and ensure consistency of application between chambers
and between trials. In national court systems, the thousands of public trials
that take place every day guarantee that the system is considered largely
accountable and transparent, and closing a trial (or parts thereof) in the name
of state secrecy becomes a rare exception to the rule. International courts
generally are not going to have that luxury. Particularly because the defense is
often blocked from being an effective participant in ex parte motions to
protect witnesses and because even the judges themselves are supposed to
give great deference to the prosecution's assertion that the information
provided by a state was only shared since it was protected under the Rule 70
confidentiality guarantee, 98 future tribunals would seem well advised to draw
up meaningful guidelines for when such measures are appropriate.
VI. DRAWING LESSONS FROM THE ICTY EXPERIENCE
As the work of the ICTY winds down, attention is already shifting to
how to apply its lessons to other forums. 99 The ten years of history of the
ICTY likely provide the best and only real laboratory for learning about the
implications of using and protecting national security evidence in international
criminal trials, since NATO and the Western powers were more heavily
involved in intelligence collection in Yugoslavia than in Rwanda or Sierra
96. Prosecutor v. Milogevid, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Decision on Confidential Prosecution's
Second Request for Permission to Call Witness B-1717 (Dec. 16, 2003).
97. Bringing Justice to Southeast Europe, supra note 82, at 4.
98. Prosecutor v. Milogevi6, Case No. IT-02-54-AR108bis & AR73.3, Decision on the
Interpretation and Application of Rule 70, 29 (Oct. 23, 2002) (stating that the Trial Chamber has the
authority to assess whether information has been provided in accordance with Rule 70(B), although
"such enquiry must be of a very limited nature").
99. See, e.g., Michael P. Scharf & Ahran Kang, Errors and Missteps: Key Lessons the Iraqi
Special Tribunal Can Learn from the ICTY ICTR, and SCSL, 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 911 (2005)
(proposing that lessons regarding matters such as effective outreach, self-representation, prosecutorial
strategy, and witness protection can be learned from the ICTY and applied to the Iraqi Special Tribunal).
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Leone. Similar dilemmas over how best to balance defendants' rights against
state security interests are likely to arise soon before international tribunals
like the International Criminal Court and even before special
"internationalized" domestic tribunals like the Iraqi Special Tribunal. In
addition, the criminal procedure of the ICTY-rightly or wrongly-is already
being suggested as one possible model for extraordinary national tribunals
that adjudicate the laws of war, like the Combatant Status Review Tribunals
or military commission trials for alleged terrorists held in Guantd.namo Bay.
The ICTY currently has the most well-developed body of law governing
procedural rights when war crimes and sensitive national security evidence are
on the line. The judges and prosecutors of the ICTY can largely be proud of
their remarkable effort in adjudicating the first major war crimes trial since
Nuremberg, but a clear-eyed look at both the successes and failures of the
ICTY can help further the cause of international justice.
Nearly all questions arising from the use of national security evidence
involve how to balance defendants' rights and the desire for openness on the
one hand with the demand for state secrecy on the other, and the ICTY
showed that it is easy to build a blind spot for the former. Although
international criminal tribunals attempt to maintain the veneer of "innocent
until proven guilty," few individuals actually believe that tyrants like Saddam
Hussein and Slobodan Milogevid are or were anything other than war
criminals. Speaking of "rights" for defendants has always been considerably
less popular than speaking of rights for victims, and it is thus easy to give
short shrift. Similarly, when debating whether to use particularly powerful
pieces of evidence that might support conviction, it is easy to toss overboard
the basic but only generalized desire to keep the trial open for educational
purposes. Unsurprisingly, therefore, the story of the ICTY when it came to
national security evidence was largely one of resolving ambiguities in favor of
state secrecy and away from defendants' rights and open trials. While in most
cases such decisions were fair and probably necessary, they also highlight the
importance of developing and maintaining clear rules of procedure to prevent
a slide toward protecting state secrets at all cost. It proved dangerously easy at
the ICTY for judges incrementally to rule against defendants or in favor of
closing trials and then to incorporate such rulings and procedures into the
Tribunal's rules, without debate about the cumulative effect these moves
might have on the perceived fairness of the proceedings.
The ICTY's experience also shows the importance of developing a
flexible framework that allows for compromise measures when national
security evidence is involved, as long as a few clear lines exist to prevent
rights erosion. Courts should generously allow for redaction and
summarization of evidence as reasonable alternatives to full disclosure of
materials to which the defense is normally entitled in discovery. Tribunals
should also, however, take a firm stance against promising to shield national
security evidence from defendants if it turns out to contain materially
exculpatory information. Although this rule might tend to discourage some
state cooperation, it ensures that basic due process rights will not be violated.
During trials, courts should consider alternatives to fully-closed sessions to
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protect classified information, such as selective redacting of testimony that
would subsequently be released (as was done with the Clark testimony during
the Milogevi6 trial), or even unclassified summaries of evidence or testimony
that could be presented to the public. If a state nonetheless insists on holding
the hearing in camera to protect its evidence, then the tribunal should
articulate a high bar as to when such measures are appropriate and force
prosecutors to either attain disclosure or go forward without the evidence if it
is not necessary to conviction. While true skeptics of international justice
might not be fully satisfied by half-measures such as delayed, redacted, or
summarized disclosure, these tools could contribute significantly to a
perception of openness and accountability.
Fortunately, the new International Criminal Court has already has taken
a much more explicit approach to drafting procedural rules governing a state's
national security information than was done in the early years of the ICTY,
devoting several interlocking articles in the Rome Statute primarily to such
issues. In essence, the Rome Statute codified many of the pro-secrecy rules of
the ICTY, but it did at least pair this tilt with enhanced procedural flexibility.
Article 72 of the Rome Statute, which specifies the applicable procedures
when a state refuses to provide information on grounds of national security or
objects to a third party's disclosure of such information, imagines a
cooperative and interactive framework in which ICC judges and prosecutors
work directly with states to try to achieve solutions such as redactions,
summaries, in camera proceedings, or attaining comparable information from
a different state source, before deciding whether justice requires the disclosure
of the materials. 101 The negotiating parties to the Rome Statute devoted
particular energy to working out the language of Article 72, since the abili
of states to resist subpoenas most directly affects state sovereignty.
Apparently less controversial among the drafting states, but arguably more
sweeping in its effects, is Article 54(3) of the Rome Statute, which allows the
ICC prosecutor to offer iron-clad guarantees of non-disclosure for any
information voluntarily provided in confidence by a state, under any
circumstance. 103 Such voluntarily provided information is even specifically
exempted from the elaborate processes of compromise laid out in Article 72.
Therefore, one of the most troubling due process concerns in the ICTY
rules-that they allow even exculpatory information to be withheld from the
accused if that information was provided to the prosecutor in confidence by a
state-has now been codified as law into the ICC.
That the ICC procedures lean heavily toward protecting state interests is
not surprising, since it was states, after all, that made up the negotiating
parties to the Rome Statute. From an ex ante perspective, with no particular
set of war criminals or trials on the line, the need to protect state sovereignty
100. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute].
101. Id. art. 72.
102. See Piragoff, supra note 39, at 275-94, for an extensive description of the Article 72
negotiating process.
103. Rome Statute, supra note 100, art. 54(3).
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and state secrecy looms large. When one gets into the specifics of individual
trials, however, it is easier to see why fairness and openness must remain
fundamentally embodied in international criminal process. A U.S. scholar and
adviser to the nascent Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST), which is undertaking the
heroically difficult effort of trying Saddam Hussein for crimes against
humanity, identified "gaining credibility in the community" and fighting off
challenges to legitimacy as two of the top lessons the IST should learn from
prior experiences with international justice such as the ICTY. 104 Of course, the
biggest threats to the IST's legitimacy in Iraq are its sketchy provenance as an
instrument of U.S. foreign policy and its continued relationship to the U.S.
occupation; in comparison, how the IST handles any potential national
security evidence is a drop in the bucket. Certainly, the obvious need to
preserve openness in Saddam's trial to help win over a skeptical public will
likely encourage state parties to declassify any evidence they might provide
and discourage prosecutors from relying on protected evidence. However,
proponents of the IST, including the United States, should well note that the
many forms of internationalized criminal justice will likely succeed or fail
together. If the ICC or ICTY are not perceived to be fair forums for high-
profile defendants, special quasi-international efforts like the IST face an
uphill battle.
Ensuring fairness and openness in international criminal procedure is
ultimately important not only to the legitimacy of international and quasi-
international tribunals, but also to debates on criminal justice within national
law communities. The U.S. government is increasingly pushing for the power
to withhold sensitive intelligence information from the accused and from the
public when trying alleged terrorist detainees before military commissions or
other non-traditional forums. Those on both sides of the debate over detainee
rights have already attempted to invoke the procedural guarantees of the
ICTY-or the lack thereof-as ammunition in this battle. In December 2001,
Human Rights Watch issued a report with a side-by-side chart comparing
ICTY procedures with the procedures created by President Bush's executive105
order establishing military commissions for detainees. HRW was able to
proclaim proudly that the ICTY rules imposed, among other things, a firm
obligation on the prosecution to disclose all exculpatory evidence-since the
report was written before the ICTY's rule was weakened. On the other side,
one of the D.C. Circuit judges hearing the detainee rights case Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld invoked the perceived lack of procedural guarantees at the ICTY as
possible grounds for holding the Bush administration to a lax standard of
justice:
Cmdr. Swift [Counsel]: Now, the government again has suggested that there might be
rules that could work around all this. What's important for Your Honors to note is that at
this time and this place there aren't any. They-
104. Scharf & Kang, supra note 99, at 916-18, 920-25.
105. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS AFFORDED DEFENDANTS: A
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE PROPOSED U.S. MILITARY COMMISSIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YuGoSLAVIA (2001), available at http://www.hrw.org/press/
2001/12/miltrib1204.htm.
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The Court: Is that also true of the-what is the name of that court, the International
Court of Criminal Justice tried the--Milogevid in Bosnia. They didn't have any rules
either. They didn't even have any rules regarding punishment.
Cmdr. Swift: The International Court, Your Honor, did develop rules.
The Court: They developed them.
Cmdr. Swift: Yes, sir.
The Court: But at the beginning they had nothing.
106
The point is not whether this particular judge had a spectacular grasp of
the ICTY or its procedural rules; certainly anyone making a more thoughtful
attempt to compare the systems would understand that the ICTY was
governed by hybrid accusatorial/inquisitorial procedures that cannot be
compared piecemeal to what the administration proposed for detainees.
Further, advocates for "downloading" international procedure into purely
nationally-driven legal systems ignore the unique checks on prosecutorial
abuse that can be found only in multilateral or international tribunals. Some
greater compromise of defendants' rights may be appropriate in forums like
the ICTY, where no one state has an interest in conviction and controls the
prosecution, the procedural rules, the evidence, and the judges. Due process
proponents cannot always pick and choose the lessons they want learned,
however, and the debate over detainee rights in military trials in the United
States shows that having a cavalier attitude toward defendants' rights abroad,
simply because such individuals seem clearly "evil," could harm not just the
project of international justice but also individual notions of due process.
Striking the right balance when states have a virtual monopoly on critical
evidence will never be easy. But when the states hold many of the cards,
international tribunals may have to make the hard choice to play with less than
a full deck.
106. Transcript of Proceedings at 58-59, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(No. 04-5393).
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